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In Britain about 7% of male employees and 10% of female employees are in temporary jobs. In 
contrast to much of continental Europe - with stricter employment protection provisions - this 
proportion has been relatively stable over the 1990s.  Using data from the British Household 
Panel Survey, and informed by relevant theory relating to probation, sorting and human capital 
investment, we find that temporary workers report lower levels of job satisfaction, receive less 
work-related training, and are less well-paid than their counterparts in permanent employment.  
However, there is some evidence that fixed-term contracts are a stepping stone to permanent 
work.  Women (but not men) who start in fixed-term employment and move to permanent jobs 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Temporary contracts are often regarded as an important component of labour market 
flexibility. Temporary workers can be laid off without incurring statutory redundancy 
payments or restrictions imposed by employment rights legislation. This may explain the 
dramatic growth in temporary jobs in France, Italy and Spain, countries characterised by high 
levels of employment protection. The proportion of temporary workers in these countries 
doubled between 1985 and 1997. In contrast, in the United States and United Kingdom, 
which have relatively little employment protection regulation, the proportion of the 
workforce on fixed term contracts has been fairly stable.
1  
While temporary contracts can avoid some labour market inflexibilities (see for 
example Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Bentolila and Saint Paul, 1994; and Booth, 1997), there 
are potential costs. Some commentators have expressed concern about the quality of the 
stock of jobs and the lack of opportunities for career advancement associated with temporary 
or flexible work (Farber, 1997 and 1999; Arulampalam and Booth, 1998).  Purcell, Hogarth 
and Simm (1999) have also found case study evidence from 50 British firms of decreasing 
employer enthusiasm for temporary contracts, owing to the low levels of retention and 
motivation of such staff.   
These issues are particularly important since governments are moving away from 
welfare benefits towards ‘workfare’ systems. Temporary jobs – in the UK, subsidised by the 
government (see Dickens, Gregg and Wadsworth, 2000) – provide an important potential 
route for welfare recipients to enter the permanent workforce. The desirability of policies 
such as the subsidisation of temporary jobs depends upon whether they are ‘dead end’ jobs 
with poor pay and prospects, satisfactory careers in their own right, or ‘stepping stones’ to 
permanent employment in good jobs.   
Remarkably little is known about temporary workers in Britain (Dex and McCulloch, 
1995), and it is therefore important to improve our understanding of their career opportunities 
 
1  The proportion of workers in fixed term contracts in France, Italy and Spain increased respectively from 4.7, 
4.8 and 15.6 percent in 1985 to 13.1, 8.2 and 33.6 percent in 1997. In the UK, the proportion of workers in 
fixed term contracts was 7 percent in 1985 (thus, higher than in Italy and France at that time) but remained 
stable over time and reached 7.4 percent in 1997. In 1997, of the 150 million workers in the European Union, 
about 12 percent were employed on fixed-term contracts (European Commission, 1999).   2 
and to assess the extent and impact of this form labour market flexibility. In this paper we 
investigate three main issues. First, we describe who holds temporary jobs in 1990s Britain. 
Second, we investigate how satisfied temporary workers are with their jobs, and how much 
training they receive compared with permanent workers. Third, we estimate how long it takes 
temporary workers to move into permanent jobs, which workers will be successful in this 
way, and how the wage profiles of workers who have ever held a temporary job compare 
with permanent workers over time. We address these issues using longitudinal data from the 
first seven waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), conducted over the period 
1991-1997. The analysis is carried out separately for men and women in employment and 
distinguishes between ‘casual and seasonal workers’ and workers on ‘fixed-term contracts’.   
Our results confirm that temporary jobs are not desirable as long-term careers. They 
typically pay less than corresponding permanent employment, and are associated with lower 
job satisfaction and work-related training. However, we do find evidence that fixed-term 
contracts are effective stepping-stones to permanent jobs. Furthermore, women who start 
with a fixed-term job and then move to permanent work fully catch-up to the wage level 
earned by women who start in permanent work. Men suffer a long-term 5% loss in wages 
from starting with a fixed-term contract.   
In the following section, we present the main hypotheses underlying our analysis. In 
Section III, we describe the data source and examine the raw data to see the extent of 
temporary job holding in the British labour market. In Section IV, we provide a picture of 
temporary work in 1990s Britain. In particular, we estimate who gets a temporary job, and 
the level of satisfaction and the work-related training of temporary workers compared to 
permanent workers. Section V examines the impact of an experience of a temporary job on 
subsequent employment and wages. The final section summarises and draws conclusions. 
II. HYPOTHESES  
Even in the UK – which has relatively mild restrictions on dismissal for redundancy or cause 
– it is costly to discharge long-serving employees.  Workers with sufficient length of service   3 
are entitled to statutory redundancy pay and can claim unfair dismissal.
2  Insofar as these are 
simple transfers from the firm to the separating worker, there is no particular reason to avoid 
permanent appointments.
3  A worker on a temporary contract will – in a competitive labour 
market – receive a higher wage that just offsets the loss of the expected value of redundancy 
pay. However, severance costs can contain a deadweight element. There is a considerable 
cost in time and expense – as well as in overall industrial relations – to a firm in being 
brought before an industrial tribunal to defend an unfair dismissal claim. For these reasons, 
firms might prefer to have a cushion of workers without employment rights who can be 
freely discharged in the event of adverse market conditions, even if the firm must pay a wage 
premium to these workers. 
  There are a number of reasons why temporary workers may not in practice receive a 
compensating differential in the form of a higher wage than permanent workers. It is not 
efficient for workers in temporary employment to invest heavily in specific human capital.  
This leads to a lower wage, but also has implications for the characteristics of workers 
holding temporary jobs. The workers holding these jobs will be the ones for whom there is 
either a greater probability of wishing to separate (either to change occupation or 
geographical location) or a higher cost (or lower benefit) to acquiring specific human capital.  
Young, single individuals might be disinclined to make a large investment in a particular job 
until they are sure of their career and regional preferences.  If it is believed – as in Lazear and 
Rosen (1990) – that women are more likely to move to non-market employment, then women 
will also be more likely to hold temporary posts. Older workers might – given the shorter 
period of return – also be less inclined to invest in specific human capital.   
Temporary workers may also differ from permanent workers in ability. The ability 
level of temporary workers very much depends upon the future job prospects of a post. It is 
possible that firms maintain a high-turnover, low ability pool of temporary workers to adjust 
employment to match market conditions. Individuals with low ability to acquire specific 
human capital will then go through a succession of low-paid, temporary jobs. Alternatively, 
 
2 The length of service needed to obtain most of these employment rights has recently been lowered from two 
years to one year.  The maximum sum awardable for unfair dismissal has also recently been increased to 
£50,000.  For women and ethnic minorities there is no limit on the sum.  This may be a deterrent for firms to 
appoint women and workers from ethnic minorities to permanent posts. 
3 Indeed, as argued in Booth (1997), government imposed redundancy pay can substitute for incomplete private 
contracting and sustain more efficient investments in specific human capital, since workers receive job 
protection.     4 
firms may view the initial temporary contract as a probationary stage – subject to job 
performance and employment demand, workers will move into permanent employment at the 
firm. If the likelihood of eventual permanency is sufficiently high, the temporary job can be 
attractive to a worker of high ability even if it is low-paid. As argued by Loh (1994) and by 
Wang and Weiss (1998), firms may seek to have the right workers self-select into 
probationary jobs by instituting a wide differential paid to the successful workers when they 
achieve permanency. 
There are other reasons why wages of temporary workers may be low. Booth and 
Frank (1996) find evidence that some unions are more concerned about longer serving 
members, and agree contracts with steep returns to seniority. Temporary workers may be an 
extreme case of outsiders, who receive a low wage compared to permanent workers. 
However, there are also situations where temporary jobs might have high wages. If 
productivity is positively correlated with the returns to general (rather than specific) human 
capital, then highly productive workers may prefer to be employed in a succession of 
temporary jobs. This may hold for high skill jobs such as computer systems experts who may 
in fact view high-paid temporary jobs as a form of self-employment.   
It may be possible to distinguish between these alternative scenarios by considering the 
dynamic aspects of temporary jobs. In jobs where the temporary contract is a form of 
probation, there will be a high probability of obtaining a permanent post at the current 
employer. In this case, the low wage during the temporary contract period will be 
compensated for by high future wages. There should be little overall career loss to starting 
with a temporary post. In contrast, if temporary jobs are held by individuals with low ability 
to acquire specific human capital, there will be a large, permanent career loss to these 
individuals.
4   
 
4 A recent literature (Autor, 1999; Polivka, 1996; Abraham and Taylor, 1996; and Houseman and Polivka, 1999) 
makes the further point that firms can hire temporary workers from temporary help supply firms who have 
economies of scale in screening and training temporary workers.  In view of this possibility, firms might find it 
optimal to only hire temporary workers when there is an element of probation involved.  Unfortunately, our data 
do not distinguish workers at temporary help supply firms.   5 
III. THE DATA 
The data used in our analysis are the first seven waves of the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS), 1991-1997. This is a nationally representative random sample survey of private 
households in Britain. Wave 1 interviews were conducted during the autumn of 1991, and 
annually thereafter (see Appendix A). Our analysis is based on the sub-sample of white men 
and women who were born after 1936 (thus aged at most 60 in 1997), who reported positive 
hours of work, who provided complete information at the interview dates, who had left 
school and were employed at the time of the survey, and who were not in the armed forces or 
self-employed. We have a longitudinal sample of 1,740 male workers and 1,981 female 
workers.  
The data allow us to distinguish two types of temporary work. The first type refers to 
seasonal or casual jobs; the second type refers to jobs done under contract or for a fixed 
period of time. The precise form of the question asked in the BHPS interviews is given in 
Appendix A. The percentages of workers in these two types of temporary work are given in 
Table 1, where individuals are disaggregated by gender. Over the seven-year period, the 
average percentage of male workers in all temporary jobs is 6.8%, with 3.9% of them being 
in seasonal and casual jobs and 2.9% in jobs involving fixed-term contracts. The proportion 
of women in temporary work is higher, with 6.3% of all women employees being in seasonal 
and casual jobs and 3.3% in fixed-term contracts.
5 Table 1 also reports the male and female 
average hourly wages disaggregated by type of contract (permanent, seasonal and casual, or 
fixed-term contract), the wage differences by contract and their significance.
6 For men, 
permanent work always provides higher wages.   The largest wage gap is between permanent 
and seasonal-casual workers, averaging £3.76 over the period, a highly significant 78% wage 
gap. The hourly pay differential between permanent and fixed-term contract workers is also 
significant over the seven-year period, but it is only £1.17 (a 16% wage gap). For women, the 
highest wages are earned by workers on fixed-term contracts, who receive a significant £0.90 
 
5 The proportions of male and female workers in seasonal and in fixed-term contracts has remained fairly stable 
over the sample period. 
6 The  hourly wage rate is given as ω =PAYGU/[(30/7)(HS+κ HOT)], where PAYGU is the usual gross pay per 
month in the current job (deflated by the 1997 Retail Price Index), HS is standard weekly hours, HOT is paid 
overtime hours per week, and κ  is the overtime premium. We set κ  at 1.5, the standard overtime rate, but all our 
results below are robust to alternative values of κ  ranging between 1 and 2.    6 
per hour (a 13% wage gap) more than permanent workers. The wage gap between seasonal-
casual workers and workers in fixed-term contracts is a significant £2.27 (46% wage gap). 
Thus the data suggest that temporary workers are heterogeneous in terms of their 
remuneration, with fixed-term contract workers receiving significantly higher wages than 
seasonal-casual workers.   
Temporary jobs differ from permanent jobs in the hours of work as well as wages.   
For men in permanent jobs, the mean of normal hours worked per week is 45, with a standard 
deviation of 11; for men in seasonal-casual jobs these figures are 28 and 17, respectively, 
while for those on fixed-term contracts, they are 41 and 15. The data show an overall greater 
dispersion for women. Their mean weekly hours of work is 32 with a standard deviation of 13 
if they are in permanent jobs, while the corresponding figures are 21 and 13 if they are in 
seasonal-casual jobs, and 31 and 14 if they are on fixed-term contracts.
7 There is a bimodal 
distribution (reflecting part-time working) of normal hours for male seasonal-workers, and for 
all types of female workers.  
The differences between workers in seasonal-casual jobs and workers on fixed-term 
contracts also emerge when we consider their distribution by occupation and industry. There 
is a large concentration of seasonal-casual male and female workers in personal and 
protective services, sales, plant and machine operative and other low-skill occupations and in 
primary, distribution and catering industries.
8 But the largest share of male and female 
workers on fixed-term contracts is in professional and technical occupations across almost all 
industries.  
The raw data also allow us to have a preliminary look at the longer-term effects of 
having had a temporary job. From the 1997 wave of the BHPS, we select a sample of 
permanent workers who were in one of the following labour market states in 1991, the first 
survey year: permanent job, seasonal-casual job, fixed-term contract, unemployed, or out of 
the labour force. Men in a permanent job in both years earn an hourly wage of £9.50 in 1997.  
Men who were on a fixed-term contract in 1991 and are in a permanent job seven years later 
earn about £1 less than those who have been permanent at both interview dates, but this 
difference is not statistically significant. The difference is larger (around £2 per hour) and 
 
7 Segal and Sullivan (1997) also find that US temporary workers display higher standard deviations in hours 
worked than permanent workers.   7 
significant for those who were either in a seasonal-casual job or were unemployed in 1991. 
Those who were out of the labour force in 1991 earn almost £4 per hour less in 1997.   
Interestingly, women who experienced a fixed-term contract in 1991 and are in a permanent 
job in 1997 have the highest female wages in that year. But the difference between their 
wages and those of women who have been in permanent jobs in both survey years is small 
(about £0.70) and not significant. The wage gap for women who were unemployed in 1991 is 
£2.30 per hour and highly significant.
9  
Overall, the two types of temporary work seem to identify two distinct groups of workers. On 
one hand, we have workers in seasonal-casual jobs, who, on average, receive lower wages 
and put in less effort (as measured by hours) than permanent workers, are more concentrated 
in low-skill occupations, and have poor future career prospects. On the other hand, we have 
workers on fixed-term contracts, who are better paid than seasonal-casual workers (and, in the 
case of women, receive higher wages than permanent workers), work longer hours and are 
primarily concentrated in professional and technical occupations. In the raw data, there is no 
significant negative career effect of having held a fixed-term contract. In the following 
sections, we investigate the extent to which differences between temporary and permanent 
workers persist after controlling for individual and workplace characteristics, and the 
consequences of various contract types for labour market transitions, remuneration and wage 
dynamics.  
IV. A PICTURE OF TEMPORARY WORK 
We now look more closely at a number of characteristics of temporary work, controlling for 
worker and workplace characteristics. We examine who gets a temporary job and the levels 
of job satisfaction and training of temporary workers compared to those of permanent 
workers.  
                                                                                                                                                        
8 A sizeable group of seasonal-casual female workers are also in transport, banking and other service industries. 
9 The post-displacement wages of workers who have been unemployed is the focus of an extensive literature (see 
inter alia Arulmapalam (2000) and the references therein), and therefore will not be a focus of the current study.   8 
IV.1 Who gets a temporary job? 
To address this question in a multivariate setting, we perform multinomial logit regressions 
for men and women separately.
10 Table 2 reports the risk ratios of being in seasonal-casual 
work and on a fixed-term contract relative to being in permanent work. For men, relative to 
the base of individuals aged 35 to 44, men aged 25 to 34 are significantly less likely to be in a 
seasonal-casual job, while men aged 45 and over are between two and three times more likely 
to be in either form of temporary work.
11 Higher educational attainment (A-level and higher 
degrees) is associated with seasonal/casual work.
12 This finding is striking given that our 
sample excludes full-time students, and thus this association cannot be accounted for by 
young people’s employment while studying, in the holidays, or in a gap year before entering 
university. Managers, professionals, and skilled workers are less likely to be in 
casual/seasonal work. Experience in the labour market (full or part-time) also has a negative 
association with casual/seasonal work.
13 An additional year of experience significantly 
reduces the risk of being in seasonal-casual jobs by about 31% and the risk of being on fixed-
term contracts by another 22%.  Workers with a high number of layoffs are more likely to be 
in temporary work. For an average male worker, an additional layoff increases the risk of 
being in a season-casual job by 49% and the risk of being on a fixed-term contract by 30%.
14 
For men, there is a clear pattern that both types of temporary work represent a secondary 
 
10 We performed several pooled (men and women) regressions. Despite the higher raw percentages (see Table 
1), the regression results show that women are less likely than men to be in any type of temporary work, after 
controlling for demographic and labour market characteristics. We always rejected pooling by gender. For 
example, when we use the same specification as in Table 2 plus “female” (the gender dummy variable), the χ
2 
test on “female” being zero in the two types of temporary work is 6.37 with a p-value of 0.0413. Higher χ
2 
values (and smaller p-values) were obtained after “female” was interacted with other explanatory variables 
included in Table 2. We also performed a test for pooling the two types of temporary work, a test for pooling  
permanent work and seasonal-casual work, and a test for pooling permanent work and fixed-term contracts using 
the procedure suggested by Cramer and Ridder (1991). The three tests strongly rejected pooling. 
11 “Age” refers to the individual’s age when he/she entered the survey. 
12 For non-British readers, those who completed their education in 1988 (born in 1971-72) were the first to study 
for the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) qualification; earlier cohorts would have studied for 
“O-(Ordinary)-level” qualifications. GCSE and O-level qualifications roughly correspond to a high-school 
diploma; “A(Advanced)-level” qualifications correspond to education beyond high-school, but short of a 
university degree. “Vocational degree” includes qualifications such as teaching and nursing qualifications, City 
and Guilds certificates, Higher National Certificate/Diploma, and University Diploma. Some of these 
qualifications may not require A-level qualifications.  
13 All the experience variables (measured in years) and the number of layoffs are constructed using the 
retrospective work history data collected in wave 3 of the BHPS and the wave-on-wave work history information 
collected at every survey. See Booth, Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano (1999).  
14 This finding is consistent with Stewart (2000) and Arulampalam (2000). Stewart (2000) argues that 
unemployment experience followed by low paid unstable jobs contributes to observed low pay persistence.   9 
labour market inhabited by the young and old, who do not have as much attachment to the 
labour force as measured by work experience and the avoidance of layoffs.       
How does the pattern differ for women? The effects described above for men largely 
continue to hold for women in seasonal-casual jobs. The main differences concern fixed-term 
contracts. Women with older children (5-18), with more education, in 
professional/technical/teaching employment, and in the public sector are significantly more 
likely to hold fixed-term contracts. In these ways, fixed-term contracts represent less of a 
secondary labour market for women. 
IV.2 Job satisfaction 
Despite its measurement problems, job satisfaction may offer a useful perspective on many 
aspects of the labour market, through its correlation with job separations, effort and 
productivity (Clark, 1996). Panel A of Table 3 reports estimates of an ordered probit model 
of seven different components of job satisfaction, as well as an overall measure, for men and 
women separately.
15 Each aspect of job satisfaction is measured on a scale from 1 to 7, where 
a value of 1 corresponds to “not satisfied at all” and a value of 7 corresponds to “completely 
satisfied”. The overall measure reveals that seasonal-casual (both male and female) workers 
are significantly less likely to be satisfied with their jobs than permanent workers. However, 
no difference in overall job satisfaction emerges between workers in permanent jobs and 
workers on fixed-term contracts. When we consider the different aspects of job satisfaction 
separately, we find that workers in both types of temporary work are less satisfied than 
permanent workers with their promotion prospects and job security.  
IV.3 Training opportunities 
Temporary and permanent workers may also differ in their receipt or take-up of on-
the-job training. In Panel B of Table 3, the pooled probit regression estimates show that the 
male probability of receiving work-related training is 12% lower for workers on fixed-term 
contracts and 20% lower for men on seasonal-casual contracts, relative to permanent   10 
workers,  ceteris paribus.
16 Female workers on fixed term contracts have a 7% lower 
probability than permanent workers of being trained, while seasonal-casual females have a 
15% lower probability. Training intensity measures the number of days of training. The 
pooled tobit regressions show that seasonal-casual workers receive, on average, between 9 
and 12 fewer training days per year than permanent workers, but there is no differential 
training intensity between permanent workers and fixed-term workers. Controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity reduces the effects on both training incidence and training intensity 
only marginally. In summary, we find that both types of temporary jobs are – relative to 
permanent jobs – of low quality, as measured by job satisfaction, and work-related training 
opportunities. These gaps seem to be larger for seasonal/casual jobs than fixed-term 
temporary jobs. This may be the case since fixed-term contracts may not have the same 
negative career effects as do seasonal/casual jobs. We investigate these career prospects in 
the following section. 
V. THE EFFECTS OF TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT ON CAREER PROSPECTS 
If temporary jobs are probationary in nature, successful workers should eventually move into 
permanent employment without suffering long-term negative wage effects. In this section, we 
examine what happens to temporary workers in terms of the duration of temporary jobs, 
whether or not such jobs lead to permanent work, and the long-term wage effects of holding 
temporary jobs. 
V.1 Job duration 
How long do temporary jobs last compared to permanent jobs? Kaplan-Meier estimates of job 
duration, including both completed and uncompleted spells, are given in Table 4, where job 
tenure is defined as months in the same job with the same employer and not involving a 
promotion. The estimates show that the median duration of seasonal-casual jobs over the 
                                                                                                                                                        
15 In the BHPS interviews, individuals are asked to report their satisfaction level for each of the seven aspects of 
their job first, and then, in a separate question, they are asked about their overall satisfaction. The pooled (men 
and women) regressions reveal that women are significantly more satisfied than men in all but two aspects of 
their job (promotion prospects and initiative). Clark (1996) reports similar results and discusses a number of 
plausible explanations.  
16 Our measure of training incidence takes the value of unity if the worker has received training in the past 12 
months to increase or improve their skills in the current job. The measure of training intensity is the number of 
days spent in skill-enhancing training during the last 12 months in the current job. Using the same definition of 
training, Arulampalam and Booth (1998) find a similar result for the first five waves of the BHPS.    11 
1990s is very short: it is about 3 months for men and 6 months for women. The median 
duration of fixed-term contracts is higher and around 12 months for both men and women. 
But permanent jobs last for a substantially longer time, with a median duration of almost 3½ 
years for men and 2½ years for women. By 5 years, almost all male and female temporary 
jobs have finished, as compared with 64% of male and 73% of female permanent jobs.  
Where do workers go at the conclusion of a temporary job? Table 4 reveals that the 
destination patterns by gender are quite similar (last column). About 71% of men and 73% of 
women in temporary jobs go to another job at the same employer; another 26% and 24%, 
respectively, go to a job at a different employer; and another 3% leaves the labour force. We 
observe virtually no transitions from either of the two types of temporary work to 
unemployment, and therefore these are not reported in the table (see Boheim and Taylor, 
2000). Table 4 shows that, of those employed in a seasonal-casual job, 28% of men and 34% 
of women have become permanent workers between 1991 and 1997. About 1 in 7 workers 
did so within the first three months of their job. However, the median seasonal-casual job 
duration before exit into permanency is 18 months for men and 26 months for women. For 
workers on fixed-term contracts, the transition rate to permanency is significantly higher for 
men (38%) and almost the same for women (36%). The median duration of fixed-term 
contracts before turning into permanent jobs is about 3 years for men and 3½ years for 
women. Finally, regardless of the type of temporary employment and gender, about 70% of 
workers gaining permanency continue working for the same employer.
17  
  To investigate the transition of workers from temporary to permanent employment in 
a multivariate setting, we specify a discrete-time proportional hazard model that relates the 
exit process to a number of individual- and job-specific characteristics. We fully exploit the 
time variation of job tenure by using a monthly measure. The time-varying regressors for 
which we have precise information (such as occupation, industry, sector and firm size) 
therefore also differ by month, while other time-varying regressors (for example, union 
coverage and local labour market conditions) take the same value for all months between 
interviews. Because we condition the estimating sample on temporary workers, the number of 
transitions is too small to allow estimation of competing-risks models, in which the exit 
 
17 Segal and Sullivan (1997) note that a majority of US temporary workers are employed in permanent jobs one 
year later, especially in clerical and technical occupations. In their analysis, however, they do not specify 
whether or not this transition occurs within the same firm.   12 
process into permanency gained in the same firm differs from that into permanency gained in 
another firm. We do, however, allow the determinants of exit behaviour to vary between 
spells starting in seasonal-casual jobs and spells starting in fixed-term contracts. The 
estimation is performed both with and without a Gamma mixture distribution that is meant to 
capture unobserved heterogeneity between individuals.
18 Table 5 presents the estimation 
results, with columns [1] and [2] reporting the estimates without and with unobserved 
heterogeneity.  For three out of the four exits, we find that including a mixing distribution is 
relevant and has significant effects on the coefficients of some of the covariates. It does not, 
however, improve the model fit in the case of the male exit from fixed-term contracts, for 
which the estimates in the two columns do not significantly differ from each other. 
Our results show that the transition from fixed-term to permanent work differs for 
men and women. For men, only age, part-time employment status, and a few occupational 
groups (craft, sales and machine operatives) appear to be good predictors for this exit. This 
result suggests that, conditional on being on a fixed-term contract, the timing of the entry into 
permanency is likely to follow a well determined temporal pattern, which has little to do with 
either observed personal and firm-specific characteristics or worker’s unobservables. The 
evidence for women is rather different. The strong positive effect of any educational 
qualification on this exit rate is likely to be spurious, as it disappears (except for higher and 
university degrees) once unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for. Also the negative effect 
of being employed in a part-time job may not be genuine for the same reason.
19 However, 
women employed in any organisation of the public sector have a much lower exit rate than 
those employed in the private sector, even after controlling for education and occupation. A 
higher number of previous layoffs increases the exit rate into permanency. This may capture 
vintage effects, as suggested by the lower risk of exit for the youngest cohort of workers. 
Finally, the local U/V ratio has a significant negative effect on the hazard rate of leaving a 
fixed-term contract and gaining permanency. A higher unemployment rate could be 
associated with a lower availability of permanent jobs in the labour market, while fixed-term 
 
18 We estimated two distinct specifications of the baseline hazard function.  The first specification constrained 
the baseline to be of the commonly adopted Weibull type, while the second is non-parametric to avoid the 
potential biases caused by mis-specification of a parametric baseline [Meyer (1990), Han and Hausman (1990) 
and Dolton and van der Klaauw (1995)].  The Weibull model was found to be mis-specified, with upward 
sloping baseline estimates suggesting positive duration dependence, clearly rejected by the data.  We therefore 
only present the non-parametric estimates.   13 
contracts may provide firms with an additional instrument to face adjustments in their product 
demand.  
Regardless of a worker’s gender, both part-time work and living in an area with 
adverse labour market conditions reduce the chance of exiting seasonal-casual work into 
permanency. Again, there is evidence of a positive vintage effect. Table 5 also documents 
some striking gender differences. For men, we find a strong occupational gradient, with 
workers in managerial, technical and craft occupations having higher risk of leaving seasonal 
and casual work than workers in semi-skilled and unskilled occupations. For women, instead, 
the occupational gradient is clearly less pronounced, while other observables play a major 
role. In particular, those employed in the local government sector and non-profit organisations 
are significantly less likely to gain permanency than those employed in the private sector, and 
so are workers in the youngest age group compared to those in the 35-44 age group. 
Interestingly, women (but not men) who work in union-covered organisations have a higher 
chance of leaving their seasonal-casual jobs.
20   
A natural hypothesis is that workers’ effort will be used by employers to screen out 
the more able or hard-working temporary workers for retention. We would therefore expect 
the amount of effort to be a crucial determinant of exit from temporary contracts into a 
permanent position at a firm. As a proxy for effort, we use the number of unpaid overtime 
hours usually worked in a week. Because of endogeneity problems, we use predicted (rather 
than actual) unpaid overtime hours, whose identification is achieved through exclusion 
restrictions. These estimates are reported at the bottom of Table 5.
21 The estimates show that, 
after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, a higher number of hours of unpaid overtime 
work increases women’s chances of exiting from any type of temporary work. This is, 
however, not the case for men.
22 
                                                                                                                                                        
19 Notice that 57% of the observed spells (measured in months) on fixed-term contracts for women are in  part-
time jobs, as compared to 18% for men. 
20 The hazard rates of leaving any type of temporary work do not significantly differ by industry. Instead, we do 
find evidence of firm-size effects. Typically, workers (both men and women) in small firms are more likely to 
end any type of temporary work into a permanent job than workers of larger establishments.  
21 The number of children by four age groups, dummy variables for cohort of entry in the labour market (5), 
region of residence (6), and whether a worker receives a performance-related pay are assumed to affect an 
individual’s exit propensity only through their effect on unpaid overtime hours. Inclusion of actual unpaid 
overtime hours does not significantly change the results, and thus we do not report those estimates.  
22 We explored the relationship between effort and exit rates by looking at two additional specifications, one in 
which we distinguish the effect of total hours of overtime work from that of paid overtime hours, and another 
specification in which we only include the number of hours of overtime work. All the other covariates enter the 
regressions as in Table 5. Again, the exit into permanency for men on fixed-term contracts does not seem to be   14 
V.2 Wage profiles 
OLS and FE estimates 
The raw data in Table 1 showed that the permanent-temporary wage gap was between 16% 
(fixed-term contract) and 78% (seasonal-casual employment) for men. For women, we 
detected a 46% wage penalty in the case of seasonal-casual workers and a 13% wage 
premium for contract workers. But perhaps part of these differences is driven by differences 
in endowments of human capital or by differences in work motivation and other unobserved 
individual components. For this reason, we estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed-
effects (FE) wage regressions to measure the effects of being in a seasonal-casual job (SCJ) 
and in a fixed-term contract (FTC) on the natural logarithm of real (1997 prices) hourly 
wages for men and women separately, after controlling for a large set of individual- and job-
specific characteristics.
23 Table 6 reports the results from two specifications. In specification 
[2], we add the interactions of SCJ and FTC with full-time and part-time experience to the 
variables used in specification [1]. We also tried other specifications that included 
interactions with educational groups and job tenure, but since such interactions were jointly 
insignificant, they are not reported. 
  The OLS estimates from specification [1] show that the permanent-temporary wage 
gap is now 16%-17% for men and 13%-14% for women; that is, controlling for a host of 
observable characteristics has reduced the gap for men and women in seasonal-casual jobs, 
and increased the gap for women on fixed-term contracts, relative to the raw wage data. The 
FE estimates in specification [1] show smaller (but always precisely determined) wage gaps 
of 11% for men in seasonal-casual jobs and women on fixed-term contracts and 7% for men 
on fixed-term contracts and women in seasonal-casual jobs.
24 
                                                                                                                                                        
significantly affected by any of the effort measures. But for all the other temporary workers, effort does matter. 
An increase in the number of overtime hours always leads to a higher hazard of exit (in both specifications), 
while an increase in the number of paid overtime hours reduces the rate of exit into a permanent job.  
23 The variables included in estimation are listed in the note to Table 6. The wage equations for women are 
selectivity corrected to account for non-participation. The participation equation used for this correction is 
performed on 2,844 women with 17,947 person-wave observations. The identifying variables are also listed in 
the note to Table 6. The estimated coefficient of the selection term is always negative, marginally significant in 
the OLS regressions, and not significant in the FE regressions. The results are unaffected if the selection term is 
obtained from a random-effect probit model.   
24 In a previous version of the paper, we also estimated random-effects wage equations. Interestingly, those 
estimates always lie between the OLS and FE estimates reported in Table 6 for both men and women. They can 
be found in Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2000).   15 
  The estimates obtained from specification [2] reveal that the effects of SCJ and FTC 
on wages differ systematically with the level of part-time and full-time experience. According 
to the OLS estimates, men with only one year of full-time experience (and no part-time work 
experience) face ceteris paribus a 17% wage penalty if they are in seasonal-casual jobs and a 
39% wage penalty if they are on fixed-term contracts. The corresponding figures according to 
the FE estimates are 21% and 22% respectively. For men with 10 years of full-time work 
experience, the wage penalty of being in seasonal-casual jobs is stationary at about 17%, but 
the penalty of being on fixed-term contracts is now reduced to 15% and, using the FE 
estimates, these two figures are even lower at 7% and 2% respectively. Similar evidence is 
found for women. Considering only the FE estimates, the wage penalty for women with one 
year of full-time experience is 17% if they are in seasonal-casual jobs and 34% if they are on 
fixed-term contracts. These figures are 2% and 12% respectively for women with 10 years of 
full-time experience. Thus, less-experienced workers are expected to face larger wage 
penalties than more-experienced ones. Given this high level of heterogeneity, our empirical 
analysis proceeds by explicitly accounting for the interactions between temporary 
employment and work experience.   
IV/GLS estimates 
We now examine wage dynamics to see if there are any monetary longer-term effects of 
having held temporary jobs. The general specification of the wage equation that we separately 
estimate for men and women follows the approach used by Hausman and Taylor (1981), 
Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Light and McGarry (1998), and can be written as 
(1)  ijt ij i ijt ijt ijt ε φ µ β β β ω + + + + + = Z X 2 1 0 ln , 
where ln ω ijt is the real (1997 prices) hourly wage for individual i on job j at time t, and X 
denotes a standard set of variables that are often included in reduced-form wage regressions 
(e.g., highest educational qualification, part-time and full-time work experience, job tenure, 
union coverage, industry and occupation).
25 The vector X also contains dummy variables 
indicating the workers’ region of residence, marital status and disability status, the sector and 
size of their employing organisation, whether they have received performance-related pay and 
 
25 For individuals who have more than one job between one interview date and the next, we assign to that 
individual the hourly wage for the interview date.   16 
on-the-job training in the last 12 months, job mobility variables (indicating whether they have 
changed job because of promotion, quit or layoff), and the average local unemployment rate. 
The vector Z includes the contract-related variables that are the focus of our study. 
Specifically, Z contains controls for the number of seasonal-casual jobs and the number of 
fixed-term contracts held over the seven years of the survey, NSCJ7 and NFTC7, 
respectively.
26 We also include interactions between NSCJ7 and NFTC7 and the linear and 
quadratic full-time experience terms. This allows the returns to ‘experience capital’ to differ 
by contract type. We exclude from our reported specification the interactions between 
contract types and other human capital variables (part-time experience and job tenure), 
because they had no additional explanatory power and did not alter the estimates of the other 
variables. The error term in equation (1) contains a time-invariant individual-specific 
component,  µ i, a time-invariant job-specific component, φ ij, and a white noise, ε ijt. We 
assume that the three error components are distributed independently from each other, have 
zero means and finite variances.  
  The estimation of (1) is performed using the instrumental-variables generalised least-
squares (IV/GLS) procedure used by Light and McGarry (1998). We use an IV procedure 
because a number of wage regressors – including work experience, job tenure and, most 
notably, those related to the contract type – are likely to be correlated with individual- and 
job-specific characteristics, which cannot be observed by the analyst and are captured by µ i 
and φ ij.
27 We treat as endogenous all the regressors in Z, along with part-time employment 
status, part-time experience and job tenure (and their squared terms), marital status, the job-
mobility variables, and the dummy variables indicating training and performance-related 
pay.
28 The instrumental variables used in estimation are given by: a) the deviations from 
within-job means of both exogenous and endogenous time-varying variables, and b) the 
within-job means of all exogenous variables. Because ε ijt is a white noise, the deviations are 
uncorrelated with the composite error term by construction, and thus they are valid 
 
26 For men, the conditional mean (SD) for NSCJ7 is 1.597 (0.920) while for women it is 1.632 (1.023). For 
NFTC7, the conditional mean (SD) for men is 1.591 (1.014) while for women it is 1.710 (1.198). 
27 See Light and McGarry (1998) for a discussion of the advantages of using a random-effects GLS procedure 
over a fixed-effects (within-individual/within-job) procedure. 
28 We have performed several sensitivity tests in which other variables in X were treated as endogenous (namely, 
part-time experience, job tenure, education, union coverage, disability status, occupation and sector). Adding 
these variables to the list of endogenous variables did not improve the statistical fit and did not have a 
statistically significant effect on NSCJ7, NFTC7 and their interactions with full-time work experience.    17 
instruments. As instruments, we also use the number of children (in five age groups) that each 
worker has during the seven-year period and the local unemployment rate.
29   
  Table 7 reports the IV/GLS wage estimates of the contract-related variables (columns 
[1] and [2]) and their interactions with full-time experience (column [2] only) for men and 
women separately. The column [1] estimates imply that men and women who had one 
seasonal-casual job between 1991 and 1997 experience, respectively, a wage reduction of 
8.9% and 6% as compared to those who had always a permanent job over the same period. 
The wage penalty associated with the experience of one fixed-term contract is half that for a 
seasonal-casual job, at 4.6% but is significant for men, while it is insignificant and around 
2.4% for women. The fraction of the residual variance that is attributable to job-specific 
unobservables is quite large (particularly for women, for whom Var(φ ij) is about 44% of the 
total variance).  This may help reconcile the differences between the raw data presented in 
Table 1 and the results presented in Table 6. In column [2] we control for the interactions of 
temporary work with full-time experience. For both men and women, we note that the direct 
experience effects are always strongly significant but smaller than in the previous 
specification. In the case of workers with one year of full-time experience, the implied penalty 
to one seasonal-casual job over the first seven years of the career is, ceteris paribus, 11.5% 
and 4.5% for men and women, respectively. In the case of workers with ten years of full-time 
experience, the penalty increases respectively to 12.3% and 8.8%, ceteris paribus. Turning to 
workers on fixed-term contracts, the wage penalty to one fixed-term contract is about 8.5% 
and 4.7% for men and women with one year of full-time experience, respectively. The penalty 
decreases to 5% and 0.4% in the case of male and female workers, respectively, with ten 
years of full-time experience. The returns to experience capital differ strongly by contract type 
and by gender. Experience magnifies the differences between seasonal-casual workers and 
those who always have been in permanent jobs, while it reduces the differences between 
fixed-term workers and permanent workers. Both these effects are larger for women.
30 
 
29 The overidentifying-restrictions tests cannot reject the hypothesis that these two additional sets of variables are 
valid instruments at any conventional level of significance, and they improve the R
2 in the first-stage regressions. 
But the estimated parameters for the variables of primary interest (NSCJ7, NFTC7 and their interactions with 
full-time experience) are not substantially altered when the additional instrumental variables are left out of the 
analysis. 
30  As a robustness check, we estimated two additional specifications for men and women.  In the first 
specification, we introduced two dummy variables indicating current employment in a seasonal-casual job or 
current employment in a job with fixed-term contract.  The IV/GLS wage estimates are similar to those obtained 
from standard random-effects regressions.  In the second specification, we tested for the presence of non-linear   18 
  To describe the effect of contract type on wages further, we compute predicted log-
wages paths from the column [2] estimates of Table 7 for workers with four different 
employment patterns. The first pattern involves workers who are always in a full-time 
permanent job for the first ten years of their career. The second and third patterns are for 
workers who hold one-fixed term contract or one seasonal-casual job respectively in the first 
period (at the start of their career) and are in a permanent job for the remaining part of their 
career. The fourth pattern involves workers who hold three consecutive one-year fixed-term 
contracts in the first three years of their career and are employed on a permanent contract 
thereafter. The predicted wages are computed under the assumptions that the individuals work 
continuously full-time for the first ten years of their career, are not disabled, are unmarried 
and childless, live in Greater London, work in the private sector in a non-union job and begin 
their career in 1991.
31 
  The results of this simulation are reported in Table 8 and graphed in Figure 1. Having 
always had a permanent job is clearly the pattern that delivers the highest real wage profile 
over the first ten years of a man’s career, with an average growth of 3% per year. Male 
workers who have one or three fixed-term contracts at the beginning of their career display 
lower wage profiles (especially at the beginning of their work cycle) but a slightly higher 
wage growth. In fact, the wage gap among these three types of workers is larger at the start of 
the career and tapers off over time as they accumulate general work experience. But men who 
started off with a seasonal-casual job have the lowest wage profile and the smallest wage 
growth. This leads to an increase in the wage gap in comparison with the other three types of 
workers, which is particularly clear when we contrast pattern 3 to patterns 2 or 4. This finding 
holds for women too. In the case of women, however, having had one or three fixed-term 
contracts at the start of the career does not permanently damage the wage profile. Indeed, 
women following pattern 2 or pattern 4 end up with the highest wage levels and the largest 
wage growth (approximately 2.5% per year over a ten-year period). The wage gap for these 
                                                                                                                                                        
effects in NSCJ7 and NFTC7 on (ln) hourly wages.  We introduced two dummy variables, the first taking the 
value of one if the worker held only one seasonal-casual job or fixed-term contract over the panel years; the 
second taking the value one if the worker held two or more seasonal-casual jobs or fixed-term contracts over the 
panel years.  For both men and women, we found no evidence of a wage penalty beyond the first fixed-term 
contract.  We detected, however, a worsening of the wage penalty as the number of seasonal-casual jobs 
increases, especially for women.   19 
two types of workers and those who have always been in a permanent job is very large at the 
start of the career, but it declines over time. It is the interaction between full-time experience 
and fixed-term contracts that cause type 4 (and type 2) workers to overtake type 1 workers, 
for their productivity increases as they move to permanent jobs as a return to this ‘experience 
capital’. While for these women there is no wage penalty after 10 years, their total returns 
from employment are lower (compare the areas beneath the curves). 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In Britain about 7% of male employees and 10% of female employees are in temporary 
jobs. In contrast to much of continental Europe, this proportion has been relatively stable over 
the 1990s. Using data from the British Household Panel Survey – which disaggregates 
temporary work into seasonal or casual jobs and fixed-term contract jobs – we found that, on 
average, temporary workers report lower levels of job satisfaction and receive less work-
related training than their counterparts in permanent employment.  This holds for both 
seasonal-casual workers and workers on fixed-term contracts.    
However, we also found evidence that temporary jobs are a stepping stone to 
permanent work.  The median time in temporary work before such a transition is between 18 
months and three and a half years, depending on contract type (seasonal or fixed term) and 
gender. Our wage growth models (which allow for potential endogeneity of many of the 
explanatory variables including contract type) show that the wage growth penalty associated 
with experience of seasonal/casual jobs is quite high for both men and women. Even with ten 
years of full-time experience, having held one seasonal/casual job has a wage penalty of 12.3% 
for men and 8.8% for women.  In contrast, men with experience of one fixed-term contract 
suffer a much lower wage penalty, 5%, after ten years of experience.  Interestingly, we find 
evidence that women who start off their career on fixed-term contracts may experience a high 
wage growth, and, within a period of 7-10 years, have fully caught up with their permanent 
counterparts.  
Overall, our results show the importance of distinguishing between types of temporary 
work. Seasonal and casual jobs are unlikely to be probationary in nature. Because of the low 
                                                                                                                                                        
31 We also assume that each individual’s occupation, industry, education, firm size, training, performance-related 
pay, job mobility patterns and local unemployment rate take the sample values for men and women respectively. 
Changing these assumptions would only alter the levels but not the relative rankings (and slopes) of the wage   20 
human capital held by workers in these jobs, wages will be low, there will be little job 
satisfaction, and poor future prospects. We find evidence for this in our study.  In contrast, 
fixed-term temporary jobs may well be stepping-stones to a future career. Although men who 
begin in jobs with fixed-term contracts suffer a permanent earnings loss, it is not as great as for 
men with experience of seasonal-casual work. This is consistent with two possibilities. The 
first is that  these men may be less able than those who immediately acquire a permanent job 
on entering the workforce. The second is that they may also lose out from never quite catching 
up on the human capital investment foregone during the period of temporary work. In contrast, 
women who start with fixed-term contracts fully catch up with those who began on permanent 
contracts. This is consistent with a view that some women, upon entering the labour force, may 
take longer to decide on their career choices. Under this hypothesis, women who begin in 
temporary work are as able as those who begin in permanent jobs, and these women eventually 
make up for the lack of human capital acquisition during the period of temporary work.   
                                                                                                                                                        
profiles in Table 8 and Figure 1.    21 
APPENDIX A 
The British Household Panel Survey and the question on “temporary” work 
 
The first wave of the BHPS, collected in Autumn 1991, was designed as a nationally representative 
sample of the population of Great Britain living in private households in 1991. The achieved wave 1 
sample covers 5,500 households and corresponds to a response rate of about 74% of the effective 
sample size. At wave 1, about 92% of eligible adults, that is just over 10,000 individuals, provided 
full interviews. The same individuals are re-interviewed each successive year, and if they split off 
from their original households to form new households, all adult members (that is, aged 16 or more) 
of these households are also interviewed. Similarly, children in original households are interviewed 
when they reach the age of 16. Thus, the sample remains broadly representative of the population of 
Britain as it changes through the 1990s. Of those interviewed in the first wave, 88% were 
successfully re-interviewed at wave 2 (Autumn 1992), and subsequent wave-on-wave response rates 
have consistently been around 95-98% (Taylor et al., 1998).  
 
The core questionnaire elicits information about income, labour market behaviour, housing 
conditions, household composition, education and health at each annual interview. Information on 
changes (e.g., employment, household membership, receipt of each income source) which have 
occurred within the households in the period between interviews is also collected.  
 
The second wave (1992) obtained retrospective information on complete fertility, marital, 
cohabitation and employment histories for all adult panel members in that year. The third wave 
(1993) collected detailed job history information. Both these retrospective data have been used to 
construct some of the variables used in this analysis (e.g, cohort of first partnership, number of 
partnerships, number of year of part-time and full-time work experience, and number of years of job 
tenure).  
 
The information on temporary work is obtained from the Mainstage Individual Questionnaire 
included in all the waves (1-7) used in the analysis. At the beginning of the “Employment” section, 
individuals are asked whether they do any paid work. If they do, then they are immediately asked: 
 
E4. Is your current job 
A permanent job 
A seasonal, temporary or casual job 
Or a job done under contract or for a fixed period of time? 
   
Further information on the questionnaire as well as on the sampling scheme, weighting, imputation 
and other survey methods used in the BHPS can be obtained at 
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps/doc/index.htm.   22 
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Table 1: Distribution of temporary work and mean hourly wages by type of contract 
and gender 
 
  Men    Women 
 Unweighted  Weighted    Unweighted  Weighted 
         
Temporary contract (%)           
  Seasonal-casual   3.9  3.8    6.3  6.1 
  Fixed-term   2.9  2.9    3.3  3.1 
N  11,186 11,167    12,821 12,830 
         
Hourly wages  (£)         
  Permanent [p]  8.55  8.59    6.29  6.32 
  Seasonal-casual [s]  4.79  4.64    4.92  4.88 
  Fixed-term contract [f]  7.38  7.47    7.19  7.22 
          
Wage differences (£)           








          








          








         
Source: British Household Panel Survey 1991-1997.  
Notes: Weighted figures are obtained using the BHPS cross-sectional enumerated 
individual weights. N is number of person-wave observations. Wages are in constant 
(1997) pounds. Absolute value of the t-test of the wage difference is in parentheses.  
           *** indicates that the wage difference is significant at 0.01 level. 
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Table 2: Relative risk ratios of being in a temporary job by gender 
(Absolute ratio of coefficent to standard error in parentheses) 
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Log  likelihood  -2,442  -3,920  
Model χ





N  11,186 12,821 
         
Note: The relative risk ratios are obtained from exponentiated coefficients of multinomial logit 
regressions. Base category is “permanent job”. The specification for all equations also includes 
cohort of entry into the labour market (5 dummies), disabled, region of residence (6), industry (9), 
firm size (7), and number of full-time and part-time jobs ever held at the start of the panel. Model 
χ
2 is the Wald statistic for the goodness-of-fit test and is equal to –2[LR–LU] where LR is the 
constant-only log-likelihood value and LU is the log-likelihood value reported in the table. Its 
corresponding p-value is in square brackets. The χ
2 statistic has 106 degrees of freedom. The t-
ratios are computed using standard errors that are robust to arbitrary forms of correlation within 
individuals. N is the number of person-wave observations. 
          * significant at 0.10 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01 level. 
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Table 3: Job satisfaction and training of temporary workers 
 
  Men (N=11,186)   Women  (N=12,821) 
Panel A  Job satisfaction measure
a 








































































        
        
Panel B  Training receipt
b 
  Pooled probit  RE probit    Pooled probit  RE probit 
















  ρ    0.331*** 
[0.0000] 
   0.298*** 
[0.0000] 
      Log likelihood  -6,351  -6,003    -6,732  -6,445 
      Model χ








Mean of dependent vb.  0.360  0.314 
   
  Training intensity
b 
  Pooled tobit  RE tobit    Pooled tobit  RE tobit 
















  ρ    0.020*** 
[0.0027] 
   0.012** 
[0.0214]   29 
      Log likelihood  -20,926  -20,875    -21,504  -21,478 
      Model χ












a Panel A: Job satisfaction. Coefficients are obtained from ordered probit regressions. For 
each row the dependent variable is “job satisfaction” measured on a scale from 1 to 7, 
where a value of 1 corresponds to “not satisfied at all” and a value of 7 corresponds to 
“completely satisfied”. The reported numbers are the coefficients (and absolute t-ratios from 
robust standard errors) on the two types of temporary work. Other variables included in 
each regression are all the variables used in Table 2 plus marital status (2 dummies), age-
marital status interactions (2), number of (marital or cohabiting) partnerships, and cohort of 
partnership (3).  
b Panel B: Training receipt and intensity. The reported numbers are marginal effects for the 
two type of temporary work obtained from pooled and random-effects probit regressions 
(top of Panel B) and from pooled and random-effects tobit regressions (bottom of Panel B). 
Absolute t-ratios (obtained from robust standard errors in the pooled probit regressions and 
pooled tobit regressions) are in parentheses. Other variables included in each regression are 
all the variables used in Panel A above plus union coverage and marital status (2 dummies). 
The term ρ  is the fraction of total variance contributed by the panel-level variance 
component. The p-value of the likelihood ratio test of ρ =0 is reported in square brackets. 
For the definition of Model χ
2 see footnote of Table 2. The χ
2 statistic has 64 degrees of 
freedom and its p-value is in square brackets. 
§ Computed on positive values only (N=3,812 for men; N=4,023 for women) 
          * significant at 0.10 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01 level. N 
is the number of person-wave observations. 
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Table 4: Kaplan-Meier estimates of job exit rates by type of contract and gender (cumulative percentage) 
 
Job tenure (months)  Gender and 
Type of contract  3  6  12 18 24 30 36 42 48 60  90  120 
N 
[%] 
Men                
      Permanent  4  12 20 29 35 42 46 52 56 64  78  85  10,427 
   Seasonal & casual  53  68  73  91  92  97              431 
     Continuing in same firm    42  56  61  79  81  89              [70.3] 
     Moving to another firm  12  21  23  49  53  60              [24.8] 
     Ending in permanency  16  27  30  48  55  63              [28.3] 
      Fixed-term  contract  22 39 49 70 74 80 84 88 89 92     328 
     Continuing in same firm    17  29  37  57  61  69  72  77  79  85      [72.3] 
     Moving to another firm  5  14  18  29  31  35  41  44  45  48      [26.8] 
     Ending in permanency  7  16  21  38  39  46  51  57  58  60      [38.1] 
                
Women                
      Permanent    6  14 23 35 41 49 54 61 65 73  86  92  11,593 
      Seasonal  &  casual  40 53 61 81 83 89 90 93 94 95     805 
     Continuing in same firm    29  40  48  69  72  79  80  84  85  87      [70.9] 
     Moving to another firm  9  16  19  32  34  45  46  51  52  58      [24.1] 
     Ending in permanency  13  21  24  43  47  55  57  60  61  66      [34.2] 
      Fixed-term  contract  24 40 48 66 71 79 81 87 88 93     423 
     Continuing in same firm    16  29  37  54  60  69  71  78  81  88      [75.7] 
     Moving to another firm  7  14  17  25  26  31  32  35  36  38      [22.5] 
     Ending in permanency  9  16  21  34  37  45  46  51  55  60      [36.2] 
Note: Figures in cells with less than 30 observations are not reported. The percentage of censored observations is in square brackets. N is the number of 
person-wave observations.   31 
Table 5: Exit from temporary work to permanent work: estimates from proportional hazard model – Non-parametric baseline hazard 
specification 
 
 Men    Women 
  Exit from seasonal and 
casual work to permanent 
work  
  Exit from a fixed-term 
contract to permanent 
work 
  Exit from seasonal and 
casual work to permanent 
work 
  Exit from a fixed-term 
contract to permanent 
work 
Variable  [1] [2]    [1] [2]    [1] [2]    [1] [2] 
                   
Age  dummy:                   
















































Education:                    
  Less than GCSE 



































































  University 

















Occupation:                     32 







































































































































Sector:                    

















































































(0.038)   33 











































































2   2.861*** 
(3.561) 
   1.14 ×  10
-4 
(0.004) 
   2.415*** 
(4.894) 
   3.778*** 
(4.743) 
                   
Log  likelihood  -382 -349    -406 -406    -989 -935    -549 -501 
Model χ


















5,602 5,602    4,591 4,591    12,016  12,016    6,716 6,716 
                   
Note: Absolute ratio of coefficient to standard error in parentheses. The term σ
2 is the variance of the Gamma-distributed random variable that 
summarises unobserved heterogeneity between individuals. All regressions also include industry (3 dummies), firm size (7), and a constant. For the 
definition of Model χ
2 see footnote of Table 2. The χ
2 statistic has 35 degrees of freedom and its p-value is in square brackets. 
a Predicted from tobit regressions which include all the variables used in the hazard models plus number of children by four age groups, and dummy 
variables for cohort of entry in the labour market (5 dummies), region of residence (6), and whether worker receives a performance-related pay. The 
tobit regressions contain nine rather than three industry dummies. The F-statistics (and p-values) of the variables identifying hours of unpaid overtime 
work are F(11,11130)=9.36 (p-value=0.000) and F(11,12763)=14.03 (p-value= 0.000) for men and women, respectively.  
     * significant at 0.10 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01 level.    34 
 
Table 6: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Fixed-Effects (FE) wage estimates  
  (Absolute t-ratio in parentheses)   
 
 Men    Women 
 OLS      FE    OLS    FE 
Variable  [1]  [2]   [1]  [2]   [1]  [2]   [1]  [2] 
                    






















   0.018*** 
(2.652) 
   0.003 
(0.467) 
   0.023*** 
(4.657) 




   -0.0003 
(1.616) 
   -0.0001 
(0.573) 
   -0.0006*** 
(3.494) 




   0.101** 
(2.140) 
   0.010 
(0.734) 
   -0.004 
(0.508) 




   -0.016** 
(2.058) 
   -0.0001 
(0.157) 
   0.0006 
(1.569) 




















   0.030*** 
(4.647) 
   0.031* 
(1.768) 
   0.034*** 
(3.533) 




   -0.0007*** 
(3.970) 
   -0.0009 
(1.141) 
   -0.0009** 
(2.223) 




   0.071*** 
(2.605) 
   0.063*** 
(3.248) 
   0.034*** 
(3.214) 




   -0.006*** 
(3.365) 
   -0.002** 
(2.331) 
   -0.001** 
(2.236)   35 






































































                    
R
2  0.544 0.546    0.216 0.214    0.539 0.542    0.170 0.169 
N 11,186    11,186    12,821    12,821 
Nr. of individuals        1,740          1,981 
                    
Note: SCJ and FTC denote the state of being in a seasonal-casual job and a fixed-term contract, respectively. Each specification also includes linear 
and quadratic terms in years of job tenure, local unemployment rate, and dummy variables for region of residence (6), educational level (5), industry 
(9), occupation (8), sector (4), firm size (7), disability status, part-time employment, marital status (2), whether worker has changed job because of 
promotion, quit or layoff, the number of previous jobs, whether worker has received on-the-job training in the last 12 months, whether worker is 
union covered and whether worker receives a performance-related pay. All wage equations for women are selectivity-corrected using a participation 
probit equation. This equation is identifies by age, time trend (6 dummy variables), cohort of entry in the labour market (5), age-marital status 
interactions (2), cohort of first partnership, number of partnerships, number of children by age group (5 age groups), housing tenure (2), and 
individual attitudes about working women (6). The t-ratios in the OLS regressions are obtained from standard errors that are robust to arbitrary forms 
of correlation within individuals. N is number of person-wave observations. 
           ** significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01 level.   36 
 
Table 7: Temporary work and wages: selected estimates from IV/GLS regressions 
 
  Men     Women  
 [1]  [2]    [1]  [2] 
          
















NSCJ7 ×  full-time experience   -0.001 
(0.298) 
   -0.007*** 
(2.786) 




   0.0002** 
(2.289) 
















NFTC7 ×  full-time experience   0.005 
(1.324) 
   0.007 
(1.193) 




   -0.0002 
(0.850) 
















Var(µ i)  0.086 0.085    0.076 0.074 
Var(φ ij)  0.054 0.054    0.093 0.091 
Var(ε ijt)  0.047 0.044    0.044 0.042 
         
R
2  0.544 0.550    0.482 0.534 
No. person-wave observations  11,186    12,821 
N 14,156    17,006 
          
Note: NSCJ7 and NFTC7 denote the number of seasonal-casual jobs and the number of 
fixed-term contracts held over the seven years of the panel survey. The terms Var(µ i), 
Var(φ ij), and Var(ε ijt) are the estimated variances of the individual, job, and transitory 
components of the residual, respectively. The other variables used in estimation are listed in 
the footnote of Table 6. All wage equations for women are selectivity corrected. See note of 
Table 6 for details on the identifications of the selection term. N is number of person-job-
wave observations. Absolute t-ratios are in parentheses. 
           * significant at 0.10 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 8: Predicted log wages by experience level and early employment patterns  
 
  Years of full-time experience    
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  7-0  10-0 
Men               
    Pattern  1  1.639 1.676 1.711 1.745 1.778 1.808 1.838 1.866 1.892 1.917 1.940 0.226 0.301 
    Pattern  2  1.549 1.591 1.631 1.669 1.707 1.742 1.775 1.807 1.837 1.865 1.892 0.258 0.343 
    Pattern  3  1.526 1.561 1.596 1.628 1.659 1.689 1.717 1.744 1.770 1.794 1.817 0.218 0.291 
    Pattern  4  1.549 1.533 1.552 1.600 1.646 1.690 1.731 1.771 1.808 1.843 1.877 0.222 0.327 
               
Women               
    Pattern  1  1.499 1.523 1.546 1.567 1.588 1.609 1.628 1.646 1.663 1.680 1.696 0.147 0.197 
    Pattern  2  1.445 1.476 1.505 1.533 1.559 1.585 1.609 1.631 1.653 1.673 1.692 0.186 0.247 
    Pattern  3  1.462 1.478 1.494 1.510 1.525 1.540 1.544 1.567 1.581 1.594 1.606 0.106 0.143 
    Pattern  4  1.445 1.436 1.447 1.487 1.525 1.561 1.594 1.626 1.655 1.682 1.707 0.181 0.262 
               
Note: Predictions are based on the estimates in column [2] of Table 7 under the assumption that all jobs are full-time jobs. Pattern 1: worker is 
always employed in a permanent job. Pattern 2: worker holds one fixed-term contract in first period and is employed in permanent job thereafter. 
Pattern 3: worker holds one seasonal-casual job in first period and is employed in permanent job thereafter. Pattern 4: worker holds 3 fixed-term 












































Figure 1: Predicted log wages by experience level and early employment patterns 
 
Note: Based on predictions presented in Table 8. All jobs are full-time jobs. Pattern 1: worker is always employed 
in a permanent job. Pattern 2: worker holds one fixed-term contract in first period and is employed in permanent 
job thereafter. Pattern 3: worker holds one seasonal-casual job in first period and is employed in permanent job 
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